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Criminal Procedure: United States v. Noriega:
Criminal Forfeiture of Attorney Fees and Due
Process Requirements
A person suspected of violating federal drug laws suddenly finds that all
of his assets have been frozen. He has received no hearing, and the court
has shown no connection between his assets and any illegal activity. He has
not been convicted of any crime, but his home, his car, his bank account,
and all his personal property have been taken by the government. Having
no assets, he is not even able to choose a lawyer to assist with his defense.
Until recently, the law was unclear as to the rights of a person unable to
retain counsel because his assets were frozen under federal criminal forfeiture
provisions' without notice or a hearing. In United States v. Noriega,2 the
District Court for the Southern District of Florida held that assets needed
to retain counsel of choice could not be placed beyond the reach of a
criminal defendant without showing at an adversarial hearing that the assets
were linked to some illegal activity.-
This note will briefly trace the history of the current federal criminal
forfeiture statutes and show how they apply to assets used as attorney fees.
Next, the note will examine the type of procedure necessary under Noriega
to deprive a defendant of assets needed to retain counsel. Finally, this note
will address the meaning and probable impact of the Noriega decision.
Background to Criminal Forfeiture
In 1970, Congress adopted the Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE)4
sections of the Controlled Substances Acts and the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organization (RICO) sections of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970.6 Both statutes contained provisions allowing for criminal
forfeiture of property.7 However, until the early 1980s, these provisions
were rarely used." Once the United States Department of Justice began
1. 28 U.S.C. § 853 (1988); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
2. 746 F. Supp. 1541 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
3. Id. at 1542.
4. See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988).
5. Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1236, 1265-66 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 848
(1988)).
6. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968 (1988)).
7. Criminal forfeiture provisions are rare in American law. Prior to the Continuing
Criminal Enterprise statutes and the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, the most recent criminal
forfeiture statute was enacted by Congress in 1862. For a discussion of the history of criminal
forfeiture provisions and the distinctions between civil and criminal forfeiture, see Comment,
Caplin & Drysdale v. United States and United States v. Monsanto, 39 CAmT. L. REv. 269
(1989).
8. See COMPTROLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATEs, AssET FoaITuP E-A SELDOM
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invoking forfeiture more often, the ineffectiveness of these provisions be-
came apparent. 9 Consequently, in an effort to provide an effective means
of obtaining forfeiture under RICO and CCE,'0 Congress adopted the
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 (CFA).1"
The CFA modified the CCE forfeiture provisions in several important
ways.' 2 The CFA's forfeiture provisions encompass a broad array of prop-
erty. The CCE allows the forfeiture of "any property consisting, or derived
from, any proceeds which the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as a
result" of a violation of the CCE 3 or any property used in the commission
of such a violation.' 4 Forfeitable property under the CFA includes real
property as well as tangible and intangible personal property. 5
Perhaps the most significant CFA provision is that which provides that
the right and title to the forfeitable property vest in the government at the
time of the act which gives rise to forfeiture.' 6 Borrowing a taint concept
USED TOOL IN COMBATrING DRUG TRAmicnio (1981) (General Accounting Office report no.
GCD-81-51).
9. Procedural limitations and ambiguity in the statutes were cited as the cause of both
provisions' ineffectiveness. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 192-95, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADxN. NEws 3375-78.
10. The forfeiture provisions in RICO and CCE as amended by the CFA are virtually
identical, and the interpretation of one is freely applied to the other. See United States v.
Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 (E.D. Va. 1986); United States v. Nichols, 654 F. Supp.
1541, 1546 (D. Utah 1987). The primary focus of this note will be on the CCE forfeiture
provision, 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988).
11. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 302-303, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040-57 (1984) (codified at, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963 (1988) and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988)).
12. For an in-depth discussion of the CFA, see Reed, Criminal Forfeiture Under the
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: Raising the Stakes, 22 AM. Cium. L. Rav. 747 (1985).
13. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2) (1988). Section 853(a) provides:
Any person convicted of a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this
chapter punishable by imprisonment for more than one year shall forfeit to the
United States, irrespective of any provision'of state law
(1) any prcperty constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the
person obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation;
(2) any of the person's property used or intended to be used, in
any manner or part to commit, or to facilitate the commission of,
such violation; and
(3) in the case of a person convicted of engaging in a continuing
criminal enterprise in violation of section 848 of this title, the person
shall forfeit, in addition to any property described in paragraph (1)
or (2), any of his interest in, claims against, and property or
contractual rights affording a source of control over, the continuing
criminal enterprise.
14. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(3) (1988).
15. 21 U.S.C. § 853(b) (1988). Section 853(b) defines property to include: "(1) real property,
including things growing on, affixed to, and found in land; and (2) tangible and intangible
personal property, including rights, privileges, interests, claims, and securities."
16. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988). Section 853(c) provides:
All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) of this section
vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol44/iss4/8
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from civil forfeiture, this relation back doctrine employs the common law
fiction that the forfeitable property itself is guilty of the crime. 7
Thus, according to this theory, the government obtains title to the property
immediately upon the commission of the wrongful act. A defendant is
thereby prevented from defeating the government's interest by transferring
the property to a third party prior to his conviction. 8
In addition to the substantive modifications to the CCE, the CFA incor-
porated important procedural changes in the law of criminal forfeiture.' 9 In
order to preserve the availability of forfeitable property, the CFA allows
the government to request a court to issue restraining orders covering
potentially forfeitable assets, either before or after an indictment has been
returned.20 Under the CFA, a court may issue a restraining order without
notice or hearing, if there is a showing of probable cause that (1) the
property is subject to forfeiture and (2) notice to the defendant would
jeopardize the availability of the property for forfeiture.2' Innocent third
parties are permitted to retain property which they have obtained as bona
fide purchasers, providing there was no cause for the purchaser to believe
the property was subject to forfeiture. 22
CFA and Attorney Fees
Given the broad scope of the CFA and its relation back clause, important
constitutional questions arise when the act is applied to require the forfeiture
of assets used to retain counsel. 23 Some courts were concerned that forfeiture
of attorney fees under the CFA would improperly impinge a defendant's
sixth amendment right to counsel.24 Requiring the postconviction forfeiture
of attorney fees under the CFA would, the Seventh Circuit feared, dis-
courage attorneys from representing RICO and CCE defendants, and thus
under this section. Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a person
other than the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture
and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the United States, unless the transferee
establishes in a hearing pursuant to subsection (n) of this section that he is a
bona fide purchaser for value of such property who at the time of purchase was
reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture
under this section.
17. See Comment, supra note 7, at 279.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 280-81.
20. 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(2) (1988).
21. Id.
22. Id. § 853(n).
23. See Recent Development, Criminal Forfeiture-Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984-
Forfeiture of Attorney Fees, 57 TENN. L. Rv. 385 (1990).
24. The sixth amendment provides, "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall ...
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Supreme Court
has interpreted the sixth amendment to include both a right to the assistance of counsel and
to the choice of counsel. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
1991]
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deprive them of their right to counsel of choice.25 Nevertheless, the Tenth
and Second Circuit Courts of Appeal found no violation of constitutionally
protected rights and upheld the forfeiture of attorney fees. 26 On June 22,
1989, the Supreme Court resolved the inter-circuit conflict over the forfeit-
ability of attorney fees by deciding two cases: Caplin & Drysdale v. United
States27 and United States v. Monsanto.
28
Caplin & Drysdale v. United States
Caplin & Drysdale involved a defendant charged with running a massive
drug importation scheme in violation of the CCE. Invoking the CFA, the
government sought forfeiture of specific assets of the defendant under 21
U.S.C. § 853. Following the indictment, the district court entered a re-
straining order to prevent the transfer of any of the potentially forfeitable
assets. However, before the court issued the restraining order, the defendant
retained the law firm of Caplin & Drysdale as legal counsel. Notwithstanding
the restraining order, the defendant paid Caplin & Drysdale $25,000 for
preindictment services. Eventually, the defendant pleaded guilty, and the
district court entered an order forfeiting almost all of his assets as part of
sentencing. 29
Caplin & Drysdale requested an adjudication of their rights to the property
under section 853(n) as bona fide purchasers for value. Caplin & Drysdale
argued that either attorney fees were exempt under section 853, or, if these
fees were not exempt, that section 853 violated their client's constitutional
rights. The district court granted Caplin & Drysdale's claim to that portion
of the forfeited assets that had been paid to them as attorney fees.30
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.3' According to
that court, the lack of a provision in section 853 exempting attorney fees
from forfeiture rendered the statute violative of a defendant's sixth amend-
ment rights.32 The Fourth Circuit granted a rehearing and reversed the
decision of the panel. 33 This time the full Fourth Circuit held that the
language of the CFA allowed for no exceptions to forfeiture such as that
claimed by Caplin & Drysdale. 34 A majority of the judges agreed that the
25. See Recent Development, supra note 23, at 390-93; see also United States v. Moya-
Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
26. See United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988); Payden v. United States,
605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985).
27. 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
28. 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
29. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 621.
30. Id.; see also United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Va. 1986) (the
district court opinion in Caplin & Drysdale).
31. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 622.
32. Id.; see also United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987) (the appellate court
opinion in Caplin & Drysdale).
33. Caplin & Drysdale. 491 U.S. at 622; see also In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988); supra note 24.




CFA did not violate the sixth amendment." The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari 6 and affirmed.
37
The Supreme Court began its analysis" by rejecting the proposition that
a district court has discretion under section 853(e) to allow a defendant to
retain assets to pay attorney fees. 9 The Court also rejected the notion that
the exercise of a judge's discretion protects assets not restrained prior to
trial from subsequent forfeiture under section 853(c). 40 Addressing the con-
stitutional claims, the Court held that the CFA does not improperly interfere
with a defendant's right to counsel of choice. 4' Although the Court recog-
nized that defendants have a right to adequate representation and to choose
their own counsel, 42 it concluded that the sixth amendment does not allow
a defendant to insist on representation by counsel which he cannot afford.
43
Pursuant to the relation back provision, all rights to the property vest in
the government at the time of the violation." According to the Court, these
rights, once vested, cannot be impaired by subsequent acts of the possessor.
45
Notwithstanding a defendant's interest in retaining counsel of his choice,
the Court refused to recognize a constitutional principle that would give
one person a right to give away the property of another.
46
Recognizing the strong interest in obtaining full recovery of assets, the
Court held that any sixth amendment interest in allowing criminals to pay
for their defense with assets adjudged forfeitable is subordinate to the
overriding interests of the government in recovering forfeitable property.
4 7
One of the purposes of the CFA was to reduce the amount of financial
resources available to organized crime and drug enterprises and, thus, lessen
the economic power of these entities.4s According to the Court, the CFA's
purposes would include an attack on the power to retain high-priced private
counsel.
49
Finally, the Court held that the CFA does not violate the fifth amend-
ment. 0 Caplin & Drysdale claimed that the CFA could be abused when
35. Id.
36. 488 U.S. 940 (1988).
37. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 622.
38. The reasoning and analysis in this case are closely tied to that in its companion case,
United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989), discussed at length infra notes 52-82 and
accompanying text.
39. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 623.
40. Id. See supra note 16.
41. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 624.
42. Id. at 625.
43. Id. at 626.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 627.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 631.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 630.
50. The fifth amendment provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Caplin & Drysdale argued that
1991]
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applied to defendmts who are wrongfully subjected to the statute. This
improper application could upset the balance of power between the govern-
ment and the accused.5' While admitting that the CFA, like all criminal
laws, carries the potential for abuse, the Court rejected the claim that this
potential misuse makes the statute facially invalid. 2 Concluding, the Court
observed that the Constitution does not forbid the imposition of otherwise
valid criminal sanctions, such as forfeiture, merely because prosecutors may
abuse those procedures in some cases. 3
United States v. Monsanto
United States v. Monsanto54 involved facts and issues very similar to
those in Caplin & Drysdale.55 In Monsanto, a defendant accused of directing
a large-scale heroin distribution enterprise was charged with violations of
both RICO and CCE. After the indictment, the district court granted the
government's ex pate motion under section 853(e)(1)(A) for a restraining
order freezing certain of the defendant's assets pending trial.5 6 Claiming
that the order impinged his sixth amendment right to counsel of choice, the
defendant moved to vacate the order to permit him to use frozen assets to
retain counsel.5 7 lie also sought a declaratory judgment directing that the
third party* transfer provision of section 853(c)"s not be used to reclaim
assets used to pay attorney fees. The district court denied the motion.59
the forfeiture statute allowed the government to upset the balance of power between the
defendant and the government and was therefore unconstitutional. Caplin & Drysdale, 491
U.S. at 633; see also Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973). Although the Court recognized
that the Constitution guarantees a fair trial in part through the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, the Court held that the Constitution largely defines the elements of a fair trial
through the various provisions of the sixth amendment. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 633.
Having previously addressed the petitioner's sixth amendment claims, the Court proceeded in
a summary fashion with its analysis of Caplin & Drysdale's fifth amendment claims. Id. at
633.
51. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 634.
52. Id. at 639.
53. Id.
54. 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
55. 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
56. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 603; see also 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A) (1988), which provides
that the court may take action to preserve the availability of property for forfeit are:
[U]pon the filing of an indictment or information charging a violation of this
subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter for which criminal forfeiture may be
ordered under this section and alleging that the property with respect to which
the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture
under this section; ....
Id.
57. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 604.
58. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988). See supra note 16 for text of § 853(c). Note that attorneys
retained to defend an actlon under the CCE would not qualify under the bona fide purchaser
exception to § 853(c).




Eventually, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, ordered
the district court to modify its restraining order to allow the defendant to
use assets that had been frozen pending trial to pay attorney fees. 0 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari6' and reversed. 62
In Monsanto, the Supreme Court held that there is no exception in the
CFA for assets used to pay attorney fees. 63 Finding the language of section
853 to be unambiguous, the Court held that the CFA clearly demands the
forfeiture of all assets which fall within its scope." Congress, the Court
noted, could not have used stronger words than those in section 853(a).
That section provides that upon conviction a person "shall forfeit ... any
property." 65 A legislative failure to specifically mention property to be used
for attorney fees could not, according to the Court, provide a basis for an
exception from forfeiture."
After declaring that sections 853(a) and 853(e) are independent of one
another, the Court held that section 853(e) does not provide a district court
with the discretion to exempt attorney fees from the forfeiture provision
under section 853(a).6 Section 853(e) is merely aimed at implementing the
commands of section 853(a), which requires the forfeiture of all covered
property." Any discretion that exists under section 853(e) must be exercised
only for the purpose of preserving property for forfeiture.69
Next, the Court rejected the petitioner's claims that the CFA interfered
with the fifth amendment due process guarantee of a balance of forces
between the accused and the government and his sixth amendment right to
counsel of choice. 70 Neither the fifth nor the sixth amendment requires
Congress to allow a defendant to use assets adjudged to be forfeitable to
pay legal expenses.71 In support of this holding, the court cited Caplin &
Drysdale.
7 2
Next, the Court ruled that freezing the petitioner's assets prior to a
conviction, and thus before they had been finally adjudged forfeitable, did
not violate petitioner's constitutional rights .7 A pretrial restraining order
does not arbitrarily interfere with a defendant's opportunity to retain coun-
sel. 74 In support of its reasoning, the Court analogized to seizures under
other provisions of the criminal law. Several criminal statutes permit the
60. 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988).
61. 488 U.S. 940 (1988).
62. United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
63. Id. at 611.
64. Id. at 609-11.
65. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988).
66. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 611.
67. Id. at 613.
68. Id. at 612-13.
69. Id. at 613.
70. Id. at 614.
71. Id. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
72. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 614.
73. Id. at 615. See supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
74. Id. at 616.
1991]
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seizure of property upon a probable cause showing that the property will
ultimately be proven forfeitable. No reason exists to prohibit a court from
freezing property under circumstances which would justify a more intrusive
interference, such as seizure.75
Indeed, upon probable cause to believe that the accused has committed
a serious offense, the government may even restrain persons via an arrest.7 6
Compared with the considerable intrusion on a defendant's rights that
accompanies seizures, the intrusion resulting from the freezing of assets
which may later be returned seemed minimal to the Court.77 Concluding
this analogy, the Court reasoned that probable cause considerations that
would support seizures would certainly also support the restraint of poten-
tially forfeitable property.
7 8
Finally, the Court evaluated the nature and relative weight of the interests
of the government and the accused.7 9 Relying on Caplin & Drysdale,8" the
Court concluded that the government's interests allow the forfeiture of
property that a defendant may have wished to use to retain counsel, without
violating the fifth or sixth amendment.8' If the government may forbid the
use of assets to pay an attorney after trial, a pretrial restraining order
calculated to prevent a defendant from frustrating that end does not con-
stitute a constitutional violation.
82
In Monsanto, the Court specifically declined to decide whether the due
process clause of the fifth amendment requires that a hearing be held before
a pretrial restraining order can be imposed.83 Because the Second Circuit
did not address the due process issue, the Court did not inquire into whether
a hearing was required or whether the hearing that took place was an
adequate one.Y As discussed below, in United States v. Noriega,85 the District
Court for the Southern District of Florida did address the timing of and
conditions under which a pretrial hearing is required.
United States v. Noriega
In Noriega, the defendant, former Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega,
was apprehended in Panama and brought to the United States following a
military invasion of Panama by United States forces. Noriega was charged
with various drug-related offenses, including conspiring to distribute and
import cocaine, distributing and aiding and abetting the distribution of
75. Id. at 615-16.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 616.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
81. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 616.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 615 n.10.
84. Id.




cocaine, manufacturing cocaine, and using interstate commerce to promote
an illegal act. 6
In the course of the Panamanian invasion, American troops seized from
Noriega's home $5.8 million in cash which they turned over to the new
Panamanian government. Additionally, Noriega's home, automobiles, and
personal possessions were seized, and some twenty-seven bank accounts
containing approximately $20 million were frozen by foreign governments
at the request of the United States. As a result of the government's seizure
efforts, Noriega was left with. only "the clothes on his back and ... in
possession of no other property.
'8 7
Noriega filed a motion to compel the government to identify frozen assets
which it believed either belonged to or were controlled by him." He also
filed motions for the return of his property pursuant to rule 41(e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,19 and to dismiss the indictment as a
result of governmental action which denied him due process of law and
effective assistance of counsel. Claiming that Noriega was unable to pay
his attorney fees because of the freezing of his assets by the government,
Noriega's lawyers filed a motion to withdraw as defense counsel. 9°
Adversarial Hearing Required
In Noriega, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida con-
sidered the constitutional implications of freezing a defendant's assets which
were needed to retain counsel. The court held that a defendant must be
granted a pretrial hearing concerning the forfeitability of allegedly drug-
tainted assets before placing them beyond the reach of the defendant when
those assets are necessary to retain counsel of choice. 9'
The district court noted that due process traditionally requires that a
criminal defendant not be deprived of liberty or property without adequate
notice and an opportunity for a hearing. 92 Nevertheless, the court recognized
that the particular procedural protections due a defendant could vary, and
86. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1510 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
87. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1541, 1542 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
88. Id.
89. Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is concerned with searches and
seizures and with motions for the return of seized property. Subsection (e) of rule 41 provides:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure or by the deprivation
of property may move the district court ... for the return of the property on
the ground that such person is entitled to lawful possession of the property. The
court shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the
motion. If the motion is granted, the property shall be returned to the movant,
although reasonable conditions may be imposed to protect access and use of the
property in subsequent proceedings. If a motion for return of property is made
or comes on for hearing in the district of trial after an indictment or information
is filed, it shall be treated also as a motion to suppress under Rule 12.
FED. R. Cium. P. 41(e).
90. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1542.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1542-43.
1991]
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are dependent upon the circumstances and interests involved in a particular
case. 93
The district court. enumerated three interests that should be considered in
deciding what process should be afforded a criminal defendant. 94 First, the
court must consider the private interest of the defendant which will be
affected by the government's action. 95 Second, the court must consider the
chance of erroneously depriving the defendant of his interest through the
procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural
safeguards. 96 Finally, the court must consider the interests of the govern-
ment. 97 This third interest includes an analysis of the functions involved
and administrative and monetary burdens that an additional or substitute
procedure would entail. 9
Applying the first consideration, the court recognized that the interest at
stake was Noriega's sixth amendment right to his counsel of choice, an
interest which the court held to be unquestionably substantial and compel-
ling.99 After conceding that the right was not absolute, in that it did not
entitle a defendant to the services of an expensive lawyer, the court went
on to hold that when a defendant seeks to retain counsel with his own
assets, his choice of counsel clearly warrants constitutional protection.'00
Turning to the second consideration, the court found a great risk exists
that the defendant might be erroneously deprived of this important interest
if pretrial restraining orders were implemented without an opportunity for
the defendant to contest those orders.' 0' Of special concern to the court was
the increased risk of erroneous deprivation in cases where attorney fees are
at issue. Freezing attorney fees, unlike freezing other assets, constitutes a
permanent deprivation because the attorney fees are needed immediately if
they are to be of any benefit to a defendant.'0 In contrast, the court
observed that in other cases assets may be returned to a defendant after a
trial, thus constituting a lesser interference with the defendant's interests. 03
Moreover, the court found that the lack of procedure in this case was
particularly onerou:;.!' 4 Not only was the defendant denied a hearing, but
also the government had not made any showing that the assets were tainted
by illegal activity. 05 By proceeding as it did, the government violated the
well-settled rule that the government cannot seize a person's assets without
93. Id.
94. The court derives, these considerations from Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)
and Wofford v. Wainwright, 748 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1984).














probable cause. 106 In the forfeiture context, there must be probable cause
to believe that the assets to be forfeited are substantially linked to the
particular criminal activity.107
In this case, probable cause was not established by indictment or by an
ex parte finding of forfeitability by a magistrate under 21 U.S.C. § 853(e).108
Government accusations that Noriega's assets were the fruits of illegal drug
activities provided the only basis for the seizure of Noriega's assets. Con-
sequently, what the government believes about the assets is not alone
sufficient to constitute probable cause.? 9 Considering the absence of prob-
able cause, the court determined that the lack of an adversarial hearing at
which the government's contentions could be challenged would deprive the
defendant of his constitutional rights." 0
Turning to an examination of the government's interest in the procedures
used, the court looked first at 21 U.S.C. § 853(e).' 1 ' Section 853(e) provides
authorization for the issuance of an ex parte restraining order upon poten-
tially forfeitable assets. By allowing an ex parte order, the court can prevent
the government from being forced to litigate the merits of a case prior to
trial.' 2 Although recognizing the government's interest in avoiding possibly
damaging pretrial disclosure of its case and trial strategy, the court never-
theless held that this interest was not so strong as to overcome a defendant's
interest in using his nonforfeitable assets to mount the most effective defense
possible."' Pointing out that a judicial finding of probable cause was not
made in this case, the court declared that, absent a finding of probable
cause, the ex parte order contemplated by section 853(e) could not be
issued."
4
In the district court's view, the danger of an innocent person being
convicted because of the unfair restraint of assets he would have used to
retain counsel of his choice is too great to allow a freeze to go unchal-
lenged." '5 The court dismissed as circular reasoning the government's asser-
tion that Noriega could not insist on representation that he could not
afford."6 "A defendant cannot be forced into indigency without due process
and then be told that he has no right to representation he cannot afford."'
17
Basic concepts of fairness require that no one, not even the government,
can take and hold the property of another when they have no legal right
to do so."8 To hold otherwise would render the constitutional guarantees
of due process and right to counsel empty words." 9
106. Id.; see also United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555 n.12 (1983).




I11. Id. See supra note 56.
112. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1544.





118. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See also supra note 24.
119. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1545.
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Having considered the government's interest in the procedures used to
obtain forfeiture, the court next considered the government's interest in
combating the drug problem in the United States. Although the court
recognized that this interest is strong, the court declared that the effort to
fight the drug epidemic must never be at the expense of the constitutional
rights of an accused. 120 "Neither Congress nor the people intended that the
Bill of Rights be a fatality in the war on drugs."'1
2'
The court carefully reconciled its holding with prior case law. The court
distinguished Cplin & Drysdale'2 on the ground that the case had merely
rejected the assert!on of a constitutional right to retain counsel with the
proceeds of a crime. Also the rule in Caplin & Drysdale applied only to
assets which have been adjudged forfeitable. 23 Further, in Monsanto, 24 the
Supreme Court explicitly left open the question of whether due process
requires a hearing before a defendant is unilaterally deprived of his assets.2 5
The Noriega court concluded that a hearing is required where the restrained
assets are a defendant's only means of securing counsel of his choice.
26
In footnote two of its opinion, the court clarified its holding and set
forth the proper timing for a hearing. 27 Specifically, due process requires
a post-restraint, pretrial hearing whenever sixth amendment concerns are
implicated.2' However, in order to protect its interest in preventing a
defendant from escaping forfeiture, the government is permitted, prior to
a hearing, to freeza assets believed to be forfeitable. 29
Despite the fact that the assets in question were not restrained pursuant
to any forfeiture statute, the court applied due process requirements of
notice and an opportunity to be heard.3 0 According to the court, the
informal manner in which the government froze assets' 3' did not protect the
government's conduct.' 3 2 Whether or not forfeiture statutes are invoked, the
government is always bound by the minimum constitutional requirements
imposed by the fifth amendment.' Further, the court declared that the
power of the executive in dealing with foreign nations, though unquestion-
119. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1545.
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting United States v. 4880 S.E. Dixie Highway, 612 F. Supp. 1492, 1497 (S.D.
Fla. 1986)).
122. 491 U.S. 617. See also supra notes 39-53 and accompanying text.
123. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1545. See also supra note 76.
124. 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
125. Id. at 615 n.10. See also supra note 76.
126. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1545.
127. Id. at 1545 n.2.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1542.
131. Letters rogatory and informal requests to foreign governments were the primary means
employed. See id.





ably great, cannot extend so far as to deprive a defendant of his right to
due process. 34
Finally, the court considered the government's claim that it was powerless
to unfreeze assets located in foreign countries.'35 Noting that these assets
had originally been restrained at the request of the United States government,
the court found these claims unpersuasive. 3 6 Despite the court's admitted
lack of jurisdiction over these foreign accounts, the court stated that its
jurisdiction over the parties was clear and that it would use this jurisdiction
to ensure the government's compliance with its orders. 137 In its pursuit of
truth, the court must protect, to the fullest legal extent, the defendant's
right to selection of counsel.'38
Nature of the Hearing
In Noriega, the court held that when the only assets available to a criminal
defendant for retaining counsel have been seized by the government prior
to trial, due process requires the government to show the probable nexus
between the seized property and the illegal activity. 39 In order to fully
afford the defendant an opportunity to test the government's case, the
government must make its required showing in the context of a limited
adversarial hearing.
40
Moreover, as part of an evidentiary hearing, the government must satisfy
certain requirements. First, the government must identify all properties and
assets seized or frozen which it believes belong to or were controlled by the
defendant.' 4' Second, the government must provide information as to the
extent of the assets, their location, and the identity of the party in control
of the assets and property. 42 Third, the government must identify all assets
over which it currently has exclusive control and those assets which have
been restrained by other parties or governments at the request of, or upon
the suggestion of, the United States government.
43
Fourth, the government must specify the nature of the actions taken to







140. The court stated:
In short ... where a criminal defendant's only assets available for payment of
attorneys' fees have been placed out of reach by government action, due process
mandates that the government be required to demonstrate the likelihood that the
restrained assets are connected to illegal activity. This finding must necessarily
be established in the context of a limited adversarial hearing which affords the
defendant adequate opportunity to test the government's case.
Id. at 1545-46.
141. Id. at 1545.
142. Id. at 1545-46.
143. Id.
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supported those actions.'" Finally, the government is required to state
whether any efforts were made to differentiate between those assets allegedly
tainted by illegal activity and those acquired by some other means.' 4 To
the extent the government is willing to concede its inability to isolate tainted
from untainted funds, the court will not require evidence and will order
that property freed from restraint.'"
Because due process requires an adversarial hearing under these circum-
stances, the defendant should be allowed to testify as to all aspects of his
assets. This testimony will aid the court in ensuring that the defendant is
not unfairly deprived of his property. 47 Should the government be unwilling
to proceed with an evidentiary hearing, the court may direct the government
to unfreeze those assets which, in the court's view, are necessary to ensure
payment of reasonable attorney fees. 14
Implications of the Noriega Decision
Noriega provides the procedures necessary to safeguard a criminal defen-
dant's rights to due process and to counsel of choice. In light of these
paramount interests, the Noriega court's decision is well founded and should
be followed. Other courts are likely to follow Noriega when faced with a
situation that threatens to deprive a defendant of his ability to retain counsel
of choice without a proper showing that his assets are criminally tainted.
Indeed, prior to the adoption of the CFA, several courts had ruled that a
post-restraint, pretrial hearing was required under the CCE.'
49
For example, -United States v. Veon'5° held, in a case involving an alleged
continuing criminal conspiracy, that the court could properly issue an ex
parte order temporarily freezing the defendant's assets. The restraining order
was deemed necessary to preserve the court's jurisdiction and prevent de-
fendants from transferring their assets before trial, thereby thwarting Con-
gress' intent that tainted assets be forfeited."' After noting that the strength
of the government's interest permitted an ex parte order to issue, the court
held that the interests of the defendant required that an adversarial hearing
be held shortly thereafter to determine the propriety of continuing the order
until trial.5 2
Like the Noriega court, the Veon court required the government to present






149. See United States v. An Article of Device Theramatic, 715 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Cro;der, 674 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911
(3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Beckham, 562 F. Supp. 488 (E.D. Mich. 1983); United States
v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
150. 538 F. Supp. 237 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
151. Id. at 242-43.




assets to the criminal enterprise. 53 As a procedural safeguard of the defen-
dant's rights, the Veon court made the Federal Rules of Evidence applicable
to the hearing. 54 By applying these rules, the court made clear its intention
that the government not be allowed to restrain a defendant's assets on the
mere assertion by the government that the assets are related to some
prohibited activity.
Similar concerns over the infringement of rights accompanying an ex parte
restraining order were voiced by the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Crozier.' 55 Like Veon, Crozier involved the issuance of an ex parte restrain-
ing order under the CCE prior to the enactment of the CFA. Exigent
circumstances, including a high probability that a defendant might evade
forfeiture by transferring his assets prior to trial, provided an adequate
basis for allowing the court to issue a pretrial restraining order without
affording the defendant an opportunity to be heard. Like the district court
in Veon, the Ninth Circuit recognized the strong interest in carrying out
Congress' intent that large scale criminal enterprises be deterred and pun-
ished by forfeiting their drug-tainted assets.'56 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit
recognized that attention had to be given to the rights of the criminal
defendant as well.
5 7
Prompted by due process concerns, the Ninth Circuit held that even when
exigent circumstances permit an ex parte restraining order to issue, the
government may not wait until trial to come forward with adequate grounds
for forfeiture of the assets. 5 According to the Ninth Circuit, an adversarial
hearing is necessary after the restraint and prior to trial. 59 Moreover, a
grand jury determination is not an adequate substitute for an adversary
proceeding at which a defendant may cross-examine witnesses, and at which
the government has the burden of proof.' 6
In Crozier, the Ninth Circuit based its holding on the strong interest of
criminal defendants in not being deprived, without due process of law, of
control of their property for the lengthy period preceding their trial.' 6' A
criminal defendant's interest in having sufficient assets to retain his counsel
of choice is an even stronger interest than that recognized in Crozier, and
is surely deserving of at least as much protection.
Conclusion
United States v. Noriega recognized the fundamental importance of a
criminal defendant's right to retain counsel of choice. By requiring a post-
153. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
154. Veon, 538 F. Supp. at 248-49.
155. 674 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982).
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restraint, pretrial hearing whenever assets needed by a defendant for retain-
ing counsel have been frozen, the- court prevented the government from
infringing this right. A person's right to control his own property should
not be infringed without due process of law, and a defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel should not be subordinated to the government's
effort to combat crime. Noriega provides procedures adequate to accom-
modate the government's need to protect forfeitable assets from fraudulent
transfers while at the same time protecting the defendant's basic right to
counsel of choice.
Certainly organized criminal enterprises and large drug cartels pose a real
threat to our nation. Indeed, the "War on Drugs" has inspired a zealous
crusade across the entire nation. However, in dealing with this threat, we
must carefully avoid reacting with hysteria by passing laws that trample the
important individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution. A serious drug
problem can never be an excuse for making bad law.
In the past, courts have provided procedures similar to those in Noriega
for granting pretrial restraining orders under the CCE.162 In the future,
courts should continue to provide for an adversarial hearing as delineated
in Noriega whenever assets needed to retain counsel have been placed beyond
the reach of a criminal defendant. Both the sixth amendment and the due
process guarantees of the Constitution clearly demand this result. 63
Nathan Whatley
162. See supra notes 149-61 and accompanying text.
163. Subsequent to the writing of this note, the issues left unsettled in Monsanto were
decided on remand to th: Second Circuit. United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir.
1991). See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. In its en banc opinion the court held
that the fifth and sixth aniendments, considered in combination require a post-restraint, pretrial
adversarial hearing in order to continue the restraint of assets needed to retain counsel of
choice. Monsanto, 924 F.2d at 1197. At the post-restraint hearing, the government would be
required to show probablz cause to believe that the defendant committed the crimes that would
provide a basis for forfeiture and that the assets specified for seizure were indeed forfeitable.
Id. at 22.
Like the Noriega court, the Second Circuit employed the three-factor balancing test set out
in Mathews v. Eldrige. See supra notes 91-118 and accompanying text. The court found that
the defendant's interest in obtaining counsel of choice was a particularly strong one that
outweighed the government's interest in obtaining forfeiture. The court also found that the
risk of erroneously depriving the defendant of his right to counsel of choice outweighed any
possible advantages that might accompany less strict procedural requirements. Monsanto, 924
F.2d at 1195.
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